The capture of the Mayaguez came at a time when American political influence in Southeast Asia was at a particularly low point. President Ford felt that a strong response was in order to both assuage the insult to American shipping and reassert U.S. fortitude in the opinion of NATO Allies. He felt that the reactions to the first such incident must be decisive. President Ford also realized that the ship had rapidly become a nationalist symbol for the American public. While he received briefings on the alternatives available in the crisis, his military advisors prepared to execute whichever alternative he selected. The Third Marine division on Okinawa was alerted and deployed to Utapao RTAFB to await the President's direction. The naval carrier, Coral Sea, was ordered to reverse its course and head back to the Gulf of Thailand. One of the alternative examined by the National Security Council and the President was to land an assault force by helicopter on the top of the Mayaguez's steel cargo containers and retake the vessel by force. The advisors looked for the nearest unit capable of mounting an assault upon the ship under combat conditions. The only unit with such a reputation closer to the scene than the Third Marine Division was the 56th Security Police Squadron at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB.

The 56th SPS was ordered to mobilize 50 of the 75 Security Police men who had been training and deploy them to Utapao RTAFB for staging in preparation for the attack. Secrecy surrounded the deployment as surprise was the key to the operation, and the plan had not yet been accepted. The Security Policemen boarded five helicopters bound for Utapeo, but one of the helicopters crashed shortly after takeoff killing 18 Security Policemen and 5 crew members aboard. Arriving at Utapao RTAFB, there was little to lift the spirits of the demoralized assault force. Only anticipation of the upcoming combat was greater than the grief for those friends who did not appear at Utapao. The Security Police assault force arrived at Utapao at 0330, May 12, 1975, and prepared to head for the Mayaguez. However, before dawn a message arrived delaying the mission for 24 hours. Within that time, the Third Marine Division assault force arrived at Utapao, and President Ford chose to use them for the rescue.

The 18 Security Policemen of the 56th SPS and the five man helicopter crew killed that day were the first casualties of the Mayaguez incident although the record was unofficial. Officially, they were reported killed in an accident during routine training. Later, all those killed were posthumously awarded the Bronze Star with Valor.

OPERATION BABYLIFT

On April 4, 1975, two USAF aircraft were supplied to participate in Operation "Babylift". A C-5, which was returning to the Philippines after delivering war material, and a C-9 were loaded with children from Saigon'' orphanages and female government employees. As the C-5 ascended to 29,000 feet, a section of the tail blew out causing rapid decompression and numerous injuries. With great difficulty, the pilot managed to land the aircraft south of Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, in the silt of the Mekong River Delta. The nurses and technicians aboard did their best to save as many children as they could. Several were awarded the Medal of Honor. At first, there was no explanation for the explosion, but Air Force officials feared sabotage. Major General Lyn, Commander of the 13th Air Force, decided to use Security Police as guards on all future evacuation flights to preclude future disasters. By 0200, April 5, 1975, he had made arrangements with Colonel Martin, 3 SPG/CC, to deploy members of the Resource Protection section at Clark AB Philippines, as evacuation escorts. Two fully armed Security Policemen rode "shotgun" on every evacuation flight.

Additionally, five Security Policemen were tasked to deploy into Tan Son Nhut with the first plane of the day, and fly out again with the last plane at dusk in order to comply with prohibitions against American combat forces in South Vietnam. As the daily evacuation missions increased, so did the workload for the Security Police. By April 21st, 36 Security Policemen were left in TDY status at the Tan Son Nhut AB airport because C-130s had been added at the rate of three an hour after dark, and there was no last plane out. The Security Policemen performed security screening at the airport, and were to prevent saboteurs and stowaways from boarding. The Air Force flew C-141s in the daylight and C-130s at night non-stop. At 0200, April 30, 1975, a C-130 was hit by North Vietnamese rockets. The five crew members and two Security Policemen aboard left the disabled aircraft to burn on the runway and ran to a fully loaded C-130 preparing to depart. Remaining Security Policemen moved evacuees under concrete abutments for protection against the constant barrage of rockets. They received and returned fire while assisting the evacuation of 400 remaining passengers. By 1600, April 30, 1975, most of the passengers had been evacuated, and by 1830, the Security Policemen boarded a CH-53 helicopter operated by the 56th Special Operations unit at Nhakon Phanom RTAFB, and were taken to the USS Midway. They finally made their way back to Clark AB, PI.

The receiving end of the Saigon Airlift was set up in Tin City on Guam at Andersen AFB. Operation "New Life" lasted three or four months and processed an estimated 75,000 refugees. It was a confusing and hastily set up camp. Security Police from the CONUS participated with Andersen AFB Security Police in establishing a sort of perimeter security. This operation was one of many humanitarian missions to be supported by Security Forces.